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DOES PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING DISTORT DEMOCRACY? A 
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES 
Martin H. Malint 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Almost three decades after the Wagner Act guaranteed most private 
sector employees in the United States the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the City of Muskegon's prohibition on any city police officer being a 
member of a labor union. 1 Although it is now settled that such restrictions 
are unconstitutional,2 collective bargaining by public employees remains 
highly controversial in the United States. For many decades, some states 
have prohibited public employee collective bargaining by statute.3 The 
controversy flared in 2011 most visibly in Wisconsin, which, over the 
largest protest demonstrations seen in that state since the Vietnam War, 
largely eliminated collective bargaining for all public employees except 
most law enforcement and firefighters and some transit workers, and in 
Ohio where the public rejected by referendum amendments passed by the 
legislature and signed by the governor that would have severely restricted 
public employee bargaining rights. The controversy, however, was not 
confined to those very visible states. Major legislation eliminating or 
severely restricting public employee collective bargaining was enacted in 
numerous other states including Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, 
and Tennessee. In 2012, legislation was introduced in Arizona and South 
t Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, Chicago-Kent College of 
Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Stephen Befort, 
Cynthia Estlund, Catherine Fisk, Ann Hodges, Cesar Rosado Marz.an, Paul Secunda, and Joseph Slater; 
and financial support from the Marshall-Ewell Research Fund at Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
I. Local 201, AFSCME v. City of Muskegon, 120 N.W. 197 (Mich. 1963). 
2. See AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. 
Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (3-judge district court). 
3. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-98 (West 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.2. (West 
2002). 
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Dakota that would prohibit voluntary recognition of unions by units of local 
governrnent.4 
Among the attacks against public employee collective bargaining is the 
contention that it distorts democracy. Traditionally, this attack has argued 
that decisions over public employees' wages, hours and terms and 
conditions of employment inherently raise issues of public policy, and 
collective bargaining mandates that one interest group, workers and their 
unions, have an avenue of access that is not available to any other interest 
group. Collective bargaining, the argument goes, may preempt other 
interest groups from being heard on such policy issues. Even where this 
argument has not led to a complete prohibition on collective bargaining, it 
has led to restrictions on the scope of bargaining. In essence, this argument 
urges that workers and their unions should have to compete against all other 
interest groups in the broader political process in attempting to persuade 
public decision makers to resolve workplace issues in workers' favor. 
The attacks in 2011, however, raised a new argument. Many attacking 
the legitimacy of public employee collective bargaining have argued that 
collective bargaining distorts democracy by inappropriately advantaging 
public employee unions in the broader political process. According to these 
arguments, confining workers and their unions to the broader political 
process is not sufficient to maintain democratic processes; rather unions 
must be stripped of their inappropriate advantages by prohibiting unions 
and employers from agreeing to allow union members to pay their dues 
through payroll deduction (dues check oft) and from requiring employees 
represented by t.he union who are not union members to pay a fee for their 
representation (agency-shop or fair-share fees). 
This Article considers these dual attacks on the legitimacy of public 
employee collective bargaining. Part II examines the claim that collective 
bargaining distorts democracy by conferring an exclusive avenue of access 
on one privileged interest group, thereby preempting the broader political 
process. Part III examines the claim that public employee collective 
bargaining inappropriately adva~tages workers and their unions in the 
broader political process. 
4. Az. S.S. 1485 (2012) would have prohibited public employers from •'recogniz[ingJ any union 
as a bargaining agent of any public officer or employee," or even meeting and conferring with any union 
for pwposes of "discussing or reaching any employment bargain," and would have authorized any 
taxpayer to sue to enforce the prohibition. The bill's final disposition is listed as "Held awaiting 
Committee of Whole." SB1485 Bill Status Overview, http://www.azJeg.gov//FormatDocument.asp? 
inDOC'"'/1egtext/50leg12r/bills/sbl485o.asp&Session_ID=I07 (last visited Sept. 25, 2012). S.D. H.B. 
1261 would have prohibited all public employee collective bargaining in that state. It was unanimously 
tabled in the House CommerCe and Energy Committee. http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2012/Bill.aspx? 
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II THE TRADITIONAL A TT ACK: PREEMPTION OF THE BROADER 
POLITICAL PROCESS 
Public sector collective bargaining in the United States greatly 
increased in the 1960s and 70s. In 1955, public sector unions had about 
400,000 members; by the 1970s that number had increased to more than 4 
million. 5 Not surprisingly, the dramatic increase attracted considerable 
academic attention. Among the leading theorists of public sector collective 
bargaining were Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter, Jr., and Clyde 
Summers. Wellington and Winter and Summers shared a common starting 
point of analysis. They urged that unlike collective bargaining in the 
private sector, which is primarily an economic process, collective 
bargaining in the public sector is primarily a political process. As such, it 
poses a danger of distorting basic democratic processes because it gives one 
interest group, public employees and their unions, an avenue of access that 
is unavailable to other interest groups and may, as a practical matter, 
preempt the voices of competing interest groups. Summers expressed the 
concern as follows: 
Collective bargaining significantly changes the role of public 
employees in the budget-making process .... The first crucial change is 
that ... the majority union becomes the exclusive representative of all 
employees in the bargaining unit .... Dissonance or indifference in the 
employee group is submerged, giving the employees' voice increased 
clarity and force. 
The second, and more crucial, change is that a responsible public 
official must bargain in good faith until either an agreement or impasse 
is reached. This means that a public official representing the city must 
deal with the union face-to-face and at length. Granting an interview, 
listening to a presentation or even engaging in discussion-the normal 
courtesy given by public officials to other interest groups-is not 
enough. When the union presents its demands, the public official or his 
representative must respond, not with evasive ambiguities or 
noncommittal generalities, but with hard answers . ... 
The third, and perhaps most important, change is that collective 
bargaining provides the union a closed two-sided process within what is 
otherwise an open multi-sided process. Other groups interested in the 
size or allocation of the budget are not present during negotiations and 
often are not even aware of the proposals being discussed. Their 
concerns are not articulated and their countervailing political pressures 
are not felt except by proxy through the city's representative at the 
bargaining table. 6 
5. See MARTIN H. MALIN, ANN c. HODGES &JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPWYMENT: 
CASES AND MA TE RIALS 229 (2d ed. 2011 }. 
6. Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Polilicol Perspective, 83 YALE. L.J. 
1156. 1164 (1974). 
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Wellington and Winter expressed similar concerns over the impact of 
public employee collective bargaining on the political process: 
Collective bargaining by public employees and the political process 
cannot be separated. The costs of such bargaining, therefore, cannot be 
fully measured wi thou! taking into account the impact on the allocation 
of political power in the typical municipality. If one assumes, as here, 
that municipal political process should be structured to ensure a high 
probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can 
make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of 
decision, then the issue is how powerful unions will be in the typical 
municipal political process if a full transplant of collective bargaining is 
carried out. 
The conclusion is that such a transplant would, in many cases, 
institutionalize the power of public employee unions in a way that would 
leave competing groups in the political process at a permanent and 
substantial disadvantage ... . 1 
Neither Summers nor Wellington and Winter regarded their concerns 
as justifying a prohibition on public employee collective bargaining. 
Rather, they cautioned that private sector labor law doctrine should not be 
transplanted wholesale to the public sector. They agreed that the scope of 
bargaining in the public sector should be narrower than in the private sector 
and disagreed over the implications of their concerns for the right to strike 
in public employment. Others, however, have urged that what they see as 
the distorting effects of public employee collective bargaining on 
democratic processes should lead to a complete prohibition on such 
bargaining. 8 
The U.S. Supreme Court has been agnostic in this debate as a matter of 
constitutional law. The Court has rejected arguments that exclusive 
representation offends the constitutional rights of free expression or free 
association of parties excluded from the forum,9 but has also held that there 
is no constitutional right to be represented by a union, even as an individual 
in a public employer's unilaterally established grievance procedure. 10 The 
common reasoning is that although individuals have a right of free speech, 
they do not have a right to compel the government to listen; the government 
may decide who it wishes to consult and who it wishes to shun. 
State courts, however, have been influenced strongly by the concern 
that collective bargaining by public employees may distort the political 
process. Enactment of the Virginia statute prohibiting public sector 
7. HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., TuE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 29-30 {1974) 
(quotation marks and footnote omitted}. 
8. See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, Public Sector Collective Bargaining Substantially Diminishes 
Democracy, Gov'r UNION REV. Winter 1980, at 5. 
9. Minn. State Bd. for Comty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984). 
10. Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps. Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979). 
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collective bargaining was preceded by the Virginia Supreme Court's 
decision in Commonwealth v. County Board of Arlington County, in which 
the court held that units of local government lacked authority to enter into 
collective bargaining agreements. 11 At issue before the court was whether 
the authority to recognize unions and bargain collectively with them was 
implied in a county's and a school district's express authority to manage 
their jurisdictions' affairs and make contracts for services. 12 In addressing 
this question, the court characterized the collective bargaining process as in 
tension with democratic principles. 13 
fTlhere can be no question that the two boards involved in this case, by 
their policies and agreements, not only have seriously restricted the 
rights of individual employees to be heard but also have granted to labor 
unions a substantial voice in the boards' ultimate right of decision in 
important matters affecting both the public employer-employee 
relationship and the public duties imposed by law upon the boards. 14 
As noted above, neither Summers nor Wellington and Winter believed 
that their perceived tensions between public employee collective bargaining 
and democratic processes warranted prohibiting bargaining. Wellington 
and Winter identified four arguments for collective bargaining in the private 
sector: that it reduces workplace conflict by developing a common 
understanding of firm and industry conditions by management and labor, 
that it furthers workplace democracy by providing a vehicle of worker voice 
in workplace governance, that it facilitates worker organization and 
participation in the public political arena, and that it equalizes inherently 
unequal bargaining power. 15 They maintained that the first three arguments 
applied to the public sector but questioned the need for collective 
representation to equalize bargaining power. 16 They distinguished the costs 
of equalization of bargaining power in the two sectors, observing that in the 
private sector the costs are economic whereas in the public sector they are 
political and less constraining on the union.11 They urged that the lesser 
need to equalize bargaining power coupled with the effect that mandating 
collective bargaining had in excluding other interested groups from the 
decision-making process should drive determination of the scope of 
bargaining in the public sector. 18 
11. 232 S.E.2d 30 (Va. 1977). 
12. Id. at 32. 
13. Id. at 39. 
14. Id. For a history of the treatment of public sector collective bargaining in Virginia., see Ann C. 
Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 
18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL 'Y 735 (2009). 
15. WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 7, at 8-9. 
16. Id. at 12-14. 
17. Id. at 14-24. 
18. Id. at ch. 9. 
. -~--------------
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Summers regarded the antidemocratic tendencies of public sector 
collective bargaining as justified because public employees will often be 
outnumbered in the broader political process by the general public which 
will demand greater levels of service at lower prices. 19 He urged that 
bargaining be required only on those subjects on which the workers' 
interests are in clear direct confrontation with the unified interests of the 
public at large. With respect to other subjects, public employee unions 
should be left to make their case in the broader political and policy debate. 20 
The caution urged by Summers and Wellington and Winter against 
importing the private sector approach to the scope of bargaining has been 
picked up by the states. For example, in Unified School District No. I of 
Racine County v. WERC, 21 the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly 
rejected the private sector test for determining whether a matter is a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining: 
In the private sector, collective bargaining is limited by the need to 
protect the "core of entrepreneurial control," particularly power over the 
deployment of capital. If resources are to be employed efficiently in a 
market economy, capital must be mobile and responsive to market 
forces . ... 
Different concerns are present in the public sector, however . ... In 
the public sector, the principal limit on the scope of collective 
bargaining is concern for the integrity of political processes. 22 
The court continued: 
Where a decision is essentially concerned with public policy choices, 
no group should act as an exclusive representative; discussions should 
be open; and public policy should be shaped through the regular political 
process. Es-sential control over the management of the school district's 
affairs must be left with the school board, the body elected to be 
responsible for those affairs under state law.23 
The court concluded that whether a matter is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining depends on: 
whether a particular decision is primarily related to the wages, hours and 
conditions of employment of the employees, or whether it is primarily 
related to the formulation or management of public policy. Where the 
governmental or policy dimensions of a decision predominate, the 
matter is properly reserved to decision by the representatives of the 
people.24 
19. Summers,supranote8,at 1165-68. 
20. /dat1192-97. 
21. 259N.W.2d 724(Wis. 1977). 
22. Id at 730. 
23. Id at 730-31. 
24. Id. at 731-32. 
I 
------~------
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Concern with preempting other interest groups from the decision-
making process has led to numerous state court decisions finding matters 
that would clearly be mandatory subjects of bargaining in the private sector 
to be merely permissive or even prohibited subjects in the public sector. In 
City of Broolfzeld v. WERC, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an 
economically motivated decision to lay off firefighters was not a mandatory 
subject of bargaining, characterizing it as "a matter primarily related to the 
exercise of municipal powers and responsibilities and the integrity of the 
political processes of municipal government. "25 The New Hampshire 
Supreme Court held that a proposal requiring just cause for discipline and 
discharge was not a mandatory subject of bargaining.26 These decisions, 
like most state scope-of-bargaining decisions, left whether to bargain up to 
the employer. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals went further and 
held that school calendar and employee reclassifications were prohibited 
subjects of bargaining, reasoning: 
Local [school] boards are state agencies, and, as such, are responsible to 
other appropriate state officials and to the public at large. Unlike private 
sector employers, local boards must respond to the community's needs. 
Public school employees are but one of many groups in the community 
attempting to shape educational policy by exerting influence on local 
boards. To the extent that school employees can force boards to submit 
matters of educational policy to an arbitrator, the employees can distort 
the democratic process by increasing their influence at the expense of 
these other groups. 27 
Like Maryland, New Jersey also prohibits bargaining over subjects it 
determines to fall outside the scope of mandatory bargaining, reasoning that 
"the very foundation of representative democracy would be endangered if 
decisions on significant matters of governmental policy were left to the 
process of collective negotiation, where citizen participation is 
precluded. '"8 
State courts have made determination of the scope of bargaining in the 
public sector tum on an ad hoc balancing of workers' democratic rights to a 
voice in their terms and conditions of employment against the public's 
democratic right of participation in governmental decision making. As 
aptly described by the Iowa Supreme Court, "[T]he balancing test requires 
courts to balance the apples of employee rights against the oranges of 
employer rights. No court has been able to successfully advance a 
25. 215 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Wis. 1979). 
26. Appeal of City of Concord, 651A.2d944 (N.H. 1994). 
21- Montgomery Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 534 A.2d 980, 987 (Md. 1987) (citation 
omitted). 
28. Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 393 A.2d 278, 287 (N.J. 1978); 
see also Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 215 N.W. 2d 837 (S.D. 1974). 
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convincing formula for determining how many employee rights apples it 
takes to equal an employer rights orange."29 As the Massachusetts Court of 
Appeals conceded, "Any attempt to define with precision and certainty the 
subjects about which bargaining is mandated . . . is doomed to 
failure .... "30 
The stakes in this ad hoc balancing of competing interests are large. If 
a matter is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, an employer has no 
obligation to provide the union with information relevant to the matter.31 
With respect to a matter that is not a mandatory subject, an employer may 
bypass the union completely and pick its favored employees from whom to 
seek input. 32 
Elsewhere, I have argued that this approach to the scope of bargaining 
in the public sector is counterproductive. I have shown how it impedes 
positive labor-management cooperation by encouraging legal battles over 
rights and power.33 I have also urged that the flaw in the evolution of the 
law governing public employee collective representation has been its 
adoption of the private sector model that recognizes a significant regime of 
employee rights with respect to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining 
while leaving all other matters to the unilateral control of management. I 
have maintained that such a dichotomy excludes worker voice from 
decisions that go to the basic delivery of public services and channels 
worker voice to gaining protections from the effects of such decisions 
unilaterally made by management. I have suggested that it is not surprising 
that when so channeled, unions have succeeded in impeding the effective 
and efficient delivery of public services. For example, a union excluded 
from having a voice in establishing and implementing standards for 
evaluating teachers will, not surprisingly, use all means at its disposal to 
protect its teacher members from management's unilateral imposition and 
enforcement of those standards. But, when the union has a voice in 
developing and implementing evaluation standards, as in school districts 
that employ peer review, the union's role changes to include protection of 
the professional standards it helped to develop. I have called for 
experimentation in the public sector to impose duties on employers to 
29. Waterloo Educ. Ass'n v. Iowa PERB, 740 N.W.2d418, 424 (Iowa 2007). 
30. City of Lynn v. Mass. Labor Relations Comm'n, 681 N.E.2d 1234, 1237 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1977). 
31. See, e.g .• Viii. of Franklin Park v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 638 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1994). 
32. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Fire Fighers Ass'n v. City of Corpus Christi, 10 S.W.3d 723, 728 
(Tex. App. 1999). 
33. See Martin H. Malin, Public Sector Labor Law Doctrine and Labor Management Cooperation, 
in GoING PUBLIC: THE ROLE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN DELIVERING QUALITY 
GoVERNMENT SERVICES 267 (Jonathan Brock & David Lipsky eds., 2003). 
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provide meaningful voice to their workers in a broad range of decisions 
beyond traditional collective bargaining. 34 
The wave of legislation following the 2010 elections that I have 
elsewhere called the tsunami that hit public sector collective bargaining35 
has eschewed finding creative approaches to worker voice that preserve 
both workplace democracy and public democracy and instead has greatly 
increased the scope of unilateral employer control. Oklahoma repealed 
collective bargaining rights for employees of mid-sized municipalities,36 
and Tennessee did the same for teachers. 37 Wisconsin stripped state 
university faculty, all employees of the University of Wisconsin Hospitals 
and Clinics, and daycare and home healthcare providers of collective 
bargaining rights. 38 Nevada took bargaining rights away from doctors, 
lawyers, and some supervisors.39 
States also significantly restricted the scope of bargaining for public 
employees. Wisconsin now prohibits bargaining on any subject other than 
"base wages," which expressly excludes overtime, premium pay, merit pay, 
performance pay, supplemental pay, and pay progressions. 4° Furthermore, 
base wages may not increase more than the increase in the consumer price 
index (CPI) as of 180 days before the expiration of the collective bargaining 
agreement.41 In many respects, Oklahoma employees have more collective 
34, See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369 (2009); 
Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: Compatible 
Marriage or //legitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL •y 885 (2007). 
35. Manin H. Malin, The Tsunami that Hit Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 16 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP.POL'Y I. 531 (2012). 
36. H.B. 1593, 53d leg., lst Sess. (Okla. 201 I), www.oklegislature.gov/BiJJinfo.aspx? 
Bill=HBIS93&Tab=(). 
37. PublicChapterNo. 738(Tenn.2011). 
38. 2011 Wis. Act IO§§ 265 (state university faculty); 279 (U.W. Hospitals and Clinics), 280 (day 
and home health care providers). 
39. S.B. 98, §§ 5, 6, 16th Leg. (Nev. 2011) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT.§ 288.140 (2011)). 
40. 2011 Wis.Actl0§3l4. 
41. Id. On March 30, 2012, the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin 
upheld the constitutionality of the restricted scope of bargaining against attacks by a coalition of unions. 
The unions argued that Act I O's disparate treatment of most public employees, on the one hand, and 
security employees on the other, lacked a rational basis in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and distinguished between employees whose unions had supported Wisconsin 
Governor Scott Walker in the 2010 election and those who opposed him, in violation of the First 
Amendment. The court did find two other provisions of Act IO unconstitutional. The court found that 
provisions of Act l 0 which prohibired voluntary pa)TOll deduction of union dues for all employees 
except security employees lacked a rational basis and, thus, violated the Equal Protection Clause and the 
requirement that unions representing bargaining units other than security employees submit to annual 
recertification elections violated those unions' and their members' Equal Protection and Free Speech 
rights. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012). On September 14, 
2012, the Circuit Court for Dane County held Act IO's changes to the Municipal Employment Relations 
Act prohibiting bargaining on all subjects other than base wages, dues check-off, and fair share fees, and 
requiring annual recertification elections invalid on constitutional and state law grounds. Madison 
Teachers, Inc:. v. Walker, No. l ICV3744 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Madison Coty. Sept. 14, 2012). Both decisions 
have been appealed. 
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bargaining protection than Wisconsin employees. Although Oklahoma 
repealed its statute that mandated collective bargaining rights in mid-sized 
municipalities, it allows collective bargaining at the option of the employer. 
In contrast, Wisconsin prohibits collective bargaining even if the employer 
is willing to engage in it.42 It is not surprising that Wisconsin Act 10 
repealed the declarations in the Municipal and State Employee Relations 
Acts that had found public employee collective bargaining to be in the 
public interest.43 
Idaho limited negotiations for teachers to "compensation," which it 
defined as salary and benefits, including insurance, leave time, and sick 
leave.44 Previously, bargaining subjects were determined by an agreement 
between the parties. The Idaho enactment also limited collective bargaining 
agreements to one fiscal year, July 1 through June 30, and prohibited 
evergreen clauses or other provisions that allow a contract to continue until 
a new one is reached.45 However, Idaho voters rejected the enactment in a 
referendum in November 2012.46 
Similar to Idaho, Indiana limited collective bargaining for teachers to 
wages and salary and wage-related fringe benefits including insurance, 
retirement benefits, and paid time off.47 The statute permits collective 
bargaining agreements to have grievance procedures, but deletes the prior 
law's express authorization for a grievance procedure culminating in 
binding arbitration. 48 The new statute prohibits bargaining on everything 
else, including express prohibitions on bargaining about the school 
calendar, teacher dismissal procedures and criteria, restructuring options, 
and contracting with an educational entity that provides post-secondary 
credits to students.49 It also prohibits any contract that would place a school 
district in a budgetary deficit50 and prohibits collective bargaining 
agreements from extending beyond the end of the state budget biennium.51 
The new law repeals a prior provision that authorized parties to agree to 
arbitrate teacher dismissals.52 
The Indiana enactment provides that the parties shall discuss 
curriculum development and revision; textbook selection; teaching 
42. Wis. Act. IO§ 169(lm). 
43. Id. § 261. 
44. S.B.1108§ 17,6IstLeg.(ldaho2011). 
45. Id§ 22. 
46. IDAHO SEC'Y OF STATE, Election Day, Nov, 6, 2012 General Election Results, Proposition J, 
www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/Results/2012/tot_stwd.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2012). 
4 7. Senate Enrolled Act No. 575 § 14, II 7th Geo. Assemb. (Ind. 2011 ). 
48. Id.§ 17. 
49. Id.§ 15. 
50. Id.§ 13. 
51. Id.§ 16. 
52. Id.§ 6. 
-- . ·~~--
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methods; hiring; evaluation; promotion; demotion; transfer; assignment; 
retention; student discipline, expulsion, or supervision of students; 
pupil/teacher ratio; class size or budget appropriations; safety issues; and 
hours. 53 However, any agreements reached in such discussions apparently 
may not be included in the contract. 
The Ohio enactment that was overturned in a voter referendum deemed 
the following inappropriate for collective bargaining: health-care benefits; 
restricting contracting out or providing severance pay to employees whose 
jobs are contracted out; granting more than six weeks of vacation, more 
than twelve holidays, or more than three personal days; employer 
contributions to retirement systems; minimum staffing provisions, class 
size, and restrictions on school district authority to assign personnel; 
reductions in force of educational employees; and seniority as the sole 
factor in reductions in force. 54 
Michigan added to an existing lengthy list of prohibited subjects of 
bargaining for educational personnel. Decision and impact bargaining are 
now prohibited with respect to placement of teachers; reductions in force 
and recalls; performance evaluation systems; the development, content, 
standards, procedures, adoption, and implementation of a policy regarding 
employee discharge or discipline; the format, timing, and number of 
classroom visits; the development, content, standards, procedures, adoption, 
and implementation of the method of employee compensation; decisions 
about how an employee performance evaluation is used to determine 
performance-based compensation; and the development, format, content, 
and procedures of notice to parents and legal guardians of pupils taught by a 
teacher who has been rated as ineffective. 55 
At the behest of the Mayor of Chicago, Illinois made a surgical strike 
against teacher collective bargaining in the Chicago Public Schools. It 
amended the Educational Labor Relations Act to provide that, in the 
Chicago Public Schools, the length of the school day and the length of the 
school year are permissive, rather than mandatory, subjects ofbargaining,56 
thus empowering the Mayor through his appointed school board to 
unilaterally lengthen the school day and school year. 
53. Id.§ 18. 
54. S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4117.08(B)(4) 
(contracting out); 4117.105(B) (severance pay to employees whose jobs have been contracted out); 
4117.108(A)(l) (vacation); 4117.108(A)(2)-{3) (holiday and personal time); 4117.08(B)(3) (employer 
contribution to the public employees retirement system); 4117 .08(B)(5) (staffing); 4117 .081(BX1) 
(school district authority to assign); 41l7.08l(B)(3) (class size); 4117.08l(B)(4) (RIF·educational 
employees); 306.04(B) (seniority-transit); 709.012 (seniority-firefighters); 3316.07(A)(l l) (seniority-
nonteaching school employees). 
55. 2011 Mich. Pub. Act 103. 
56. S.B. 7 § 10, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011). 
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Although much of the "tsunami" focused on eliminating employee 
involvement in noneconomic workplace decision making, a number of 
states focused on healthcare benefits. Although most law enforcement and 
fire protection personnel were exempted from Wisconsin's prohibition on 
bargaining for anything other than base wages, the state's regular biannual 
budget act prohibited bargaining over law enforcement and firefighter 
health insurance.57 Ohio's enactment deemed "not appropriate" for 
bargaining, inter alia, health-care benefits, except that the parties may agree 
that the employer will pay up to eighty-five percent of the premiums.58 
New Jersey suspended bargaining over healthcare benefits for four 
years while a new statute is phased in. The statute sets a sliding scale 
according to salary of mandatory employee contributions to healthcare 
premiums and provides for healthcare plans to be designed by two state 
committees, one for education and one for the rest of the public sector. 59 
Massachusetts enacted a new method for local governments to make 
changes in health insurance. The governing body may adopt changes in 
accordance with estimated cost savings and proof of the savings. It gives 
notice to each bargaining unit and a retiree representative. The retiree 
representative and the bargaining unit representatives form a public 
employee committee that negotiates with the employer for up to thirty days. 
After thirty days, the matter is submitted to a tripartite committee, which, 
within ten days, can approve the employer's proposed changes, reject them, 
or remand for additional information. The committee's decision is finat. 60 
These legislative initiatives replace worker voice with unilateral 
employer control. Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker called for as much. 
In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, he argued that such action would 
give employers "the tools to reward productive workers and improve their 
operations. Most crucially, our reforms confront the barriers of collective 
bargaining that currently block innovation and reform. "61 
In contrast to Governor Walker's urgings, during the debates over the 
Wisconsin legislation, the Wisconsin Association of School Boards 
reported that many of its members were "gravely concerned" that the bill 
57. 2011 Wis. Act 32 § 2409cy. 
58. S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(8)(2), 
(E). 
59. 2011 N.J. Laws ch. 78. 
60. 2011 Mass. Acts, ch. 69. Media reports suggested that in April when the Massachusetts House 
passed more restrictive legislation, President Obama's Director of Intergovernmental Affairs telephoned 
Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick with concerns about the bill, which had been strongly opposed 
by organized labor. The governor negotiated changes with labor leaders whose attitude changed from a 
vow to fight the legislation ''to the bitter end" to support and congratulations to the governor for 
"listening to labor's concerns." See Michael Levenson, Nalional Scrutiny for Mass. Labor Law, Bos. 
GLOBE, July 12, 2011. 
61. Scott Walker, Op-Ed., Why I'm Fighting in Wisconsin, WALL. ST.J., Mar. 10, 2011, at Al7. 
I 
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would "immeasurably harm the collaborative relationships that exist 
between school boards and teachers. "62 Hundreds of local government 
officials signed an open letter to the governor opposing the bill on similar 
grounds.63 In Chicago, the school board's assertion of its newly acquired 
right to unilaterally increase the length of the school day contributed to a 
relationship with the teachers' union that an independent fact finder called 
"toxic,''64 and led to a strike that closed the Chicago Public Schools for 
seven school days. The view that replacing mandated worker voice with 
unilateral employer control will result in improved public services is naive 
at best. As discussed previously, the elimination of worker voice in most 
decisions affecting public employees will likely redound to the detriment 
not only of employees, but also the public. 
Ill. THE NEW AITACK: PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
lNAPPROPRIATEL Y ADV ANT AGES PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS IN THE 
BROADER POLITICAL PROCESS 
The shift toward unilateral employer control shifts decision making 
concerning public employees' compensation and working conditions from 
the bargaining table to the broader political process. In this process, public 
employee unions must compete against other interest groups. Although 
Wellington and Winter regarded as a positive rationale for collective 
bargaining rights in both the private and public sectors that such action 
facilitates worker organization as a political force, 65 more recent attacks on 
public sector collective bargaining regard worker organization as a political 
force negatively. 
For example, CCNY Professor Daniel DiSalvo contends that public 
sector unions spend massively on political candidates and lobbying to 
increase the demand for public services and maintain public employment at 
unsustainable levels.66 He suggests, as an example, that political 
expenditures of the California Correctional Peace Officers Association led 
to the building of more prisons and California's three strikes law, 
62. Letter from John H. Ashley, Executive Director, Wisconsin Association of School Boards to 
Hon. Alberta Darling and Hon, Robin Vos, Co-Chairs, Wisconsin Legislature Joint Committee on 
Finance (Feb. IS, 2011) (on file with author). 
63. See Erin Richards et al., Clash Continues: Budget Battle-Day 12 Many City Officials Think 
Union Limits Go Too Far, MILWAUKEEJ. $ENTll'1EL, Feb. 27, 2001, available at 2011WLNR3854288. 
64. Chicago Board of Education and Chicago Teachers Union Local l, Am. Fedn of Teachers, 
AFL-CIO, Arb. Ref 12.178 ar 56 (July 16, 2012) (Benn. Fact-Finder); see Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & 
Joel Hood, Arbi'trator Scolds CPS Teachers Union for Stubbornness as Threat of Strike Looms, Cm. 
TRIB., July 18, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-18/news/ct-met-cps-fact-finder-report-
0718-20 120718 _I_ cps-teachers-teachers-union-school-day-and-year. 
65. WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 7, at 8, 12. 
66. Daniel Di.Salvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT'l AFFAIRS. Fall 20 I 0, at I . 
• 
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mandating incarceration of individuals convicted for the third time of 
certain felonies.67 He argues that prohibiting agency-shop fees and dues 
check-off "would let workers retain their right to negotiate with their 
employers but put them on a level playing field in the political arena.''68 
Similarly, Northwestern University Law Professors John McGinnis and 
Max Schanzenbach argue, "Public employee unions, by virtue of the dues 
they collect from members, possess war chests from which they can 
contribute to politicians who support their goals. These goals, not 
surprisingly, involve first and foremost accruing benefits for their members. 
It is an axiom of political science that politicians tend to reward 
concentrated groups at the expense of the public, because these groups can 
in tum provide the most rewards to them."69 Unlike other interest groups, 
McGinnis and Schanzenbach maintain, "public sector unions enjoy the 
legal privilege of assessing dues from their members," something they label 
"the coercive authority to collect dues" that provides "the legal 
infrastructure to become particularly effective at wielding political 
influence. "70 
Not surprisingly, the tsunami that has hit public sector collective 
bargaining has taken aim at union treasuries. Legislatures have taken steps 
to preclude unions from assessing agency-shop or fair-share fees against 
employees in the bargaining unit they represent who choose not to join the 
union. Legislatures have also taken steps to make it more difficult for 
unions to collect dues from those employees who voluntarily choose to join, 
by prohibiting employers from agreeing to dues check-offs or restricting 
such arrangements. 
In 2012, amid much controversy, Indiana enacted a "right to work" 
law which prohibited union security agreements in the private sector.71 A 
year earlier, amid much less controversy, Indiana prohibited such 
agreements in public educationn Similarly, Wisconsin prohibited agency-
67. Id. at 11-12. 
68. DANIEL DISALVO, DUES AND DEEP POCKETS: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS' MONEY MACHINE 10 
(Manhattan Institute Civic Report No. 67, Feb. 2012), available at http://www.manhattan-
institute.orgfpdti'cr_67 .pdf. 
69. John 0. McGinnis & Max Schanzenbach, The Case Against Public Sector Unions, 162 
HOOVER INST. PoL'Y REV. (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.hoover.org/publicationslpolicy-review/ 
article/43266. 
70. Id. 
71. H. Enrolled Act No. 1001, II 7th Gen. Assembly (Ind. 2012). 
72. Prior to the 2011 enactment, the Indiana Court of Appeals held lawful a collective bargaining 
agreement provision obligating teachers who were not members of the union to pay the union a fair 
share fee, as long as failure to pay was not grounds for the nonpayer's dismissal. Ft. Wayne Educ. 
Ass'n v. Goetz, 443 N.E.2d 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). The 2011 enactment prohibited bargaining over 
all subjects, presumably including union security, except for wages and wage-related fringe benefits. 
See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Indiana has no statute conferring collective bargaining rights 
on public employees outside of public education but municipalities may confer such rights on their 
employees. See AFSCME v. City of Gary, 578 N.E.2d 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). In 1990, Indiana 
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shop or fair-share fee agreements for all public employees except exempted 
public safety personnel.73 Following the November 20I2 elections, the 
lame duck Michigan Legislature enacted "right to work" laws for the 
private74 and public sectors.75 The latter does not apply to police, 
firefighters, or state troopers.76 
Wisconsin also prohibited voluntary dues check-off for all employees 
except exempted public safety personnel.77 As discussed infra, the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin enjoined the 
dues check-off prohibition as unconstitutional, but that decision was 
reversed by a divided Seveth Circuit Court of Appeals.78 Michigan 
prohibited dues check-off for employees in public education. 79 It too has 
been enjoined by a United States District Court.80 The Tennessee 
Collaborative Conferencing Act, which replaced its teacher collective 
bargaining statute, permits dues check-off generally, but prohibits it for 
political contributions.81 California voters have three times rejected 
initiatives that would have prohibited payroll deductions used for political 
purposes, most recently in November 2012.82 In 2009, the Supreme Court 
upheld Idaho's prohibition on dues deduction for political expenditures 
against constitutional attack. 83 The attacks on union security fees and dues 
check off are considered in turn below. 
A. Union Security Fees 
The law is clear that public employers and the unions representing 
their employees may not require employees to join the union as a condition 
of employment, but may require them to pay an agency-shop or fair-share 
Governor Evan Bayh issued an executive order conferring collective bargaining rights on state 
employees. Exec. Order 90-6 (Ind. 1990). Although Governor Mitch Daniels, on his first full day in 
office in 2005 revoked the executive order, thereby eliminating collective bargaining for state 
employees; see Steven Greenhouse, In Indiana, Clues to Future of Wisconsin Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
26, 2011; the Indiana Court of Appeals held lawful a fair share fee provision ofa collective bargaining 
agreement negotiated under the Bayh executive order. Byrd v. AFSCME, 781 N.E.2d 713 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2003). By analogy to Byrd, with the absence of any statutory prohibition, it is arguable that union 
security provisions in municipal collective bargaining agreements remain lawful in Indiana. 
13. 2011 Wis. ACI 10 §§ 219, 276. 
74. 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 348 (Dec. l l, 2012). 
15. 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 349 (Dec. 11, 2012). 
16. Id.§§ 14(4)(a)(i), (ii). 
17. 2011 Wis. Act. 10 §§ 227, 298. 
78. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), rev'd, Nos. 12-
1854, 12-2011 & 12-2058 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2013). 
79. Mich. Pub. Act 53 (2012). 
80. Bailey v. Callaghan. 193 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2820 (E.D. Mich. 2012), stay denied, 2012 WL 
3134338 (E.D. Mich. Aug. l, 2012). 
81. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 49-5-608(b)(6) (2011). 
82. See Gene Cubbison & Lauren Steussy, Voters Reject Prop. 32 in California (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/locaVProposition-32-Results-Come-In- l 77 558611.html. 
83. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
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fee representing their pro rata share of the costs of their representation.84 
The fee must be based on the percentage of union expenditures that went to 
chargeable activities and the Court has undertaken an expenditure by 
expenditure review of what the parties may constitutionally charge non-
member fee payers.85 The First Amendment also requires that the parties 
provide procedural protections against fee payers paying for nonchargeable 
political or ideological expenditures. These procedures include advance 
reductions from base dues and escrowing to ensure that nonmember 
payments are not used even temporarily for political or ideological 
purposes, notice to fee payers detailing how the percentage of dues 
attributable to chargeable activity was calculated, and an opportunity for fee 
payers to challenge the union's calculation of the fee and have their 
challenges resolved by an independent decision maker.86 Although the 
Constitution does not require unions to reduce the fees charged to 
nonmembers who voice no objection to being charged for political or 
ideological expenditures, states are constitutionally free to limit unions to 
charging fee payers only for chargeable expenditures unless the fee payer 
affirmatively consents to paying for political or ideological activity. 87 
Thus, agency-shop and fair-share fee provisions of collective 
bargaining agreements cannot obligate nonmembers to subsidize union 
political or ideological activity. However, when such union security 
agreements are prohibited, the ability of union members to participate in the 
broader political process is significantly reduced. This is because the union 
remains obligated to represent nonmembers who are employed in the 
bargaining unit. Thus, the dues paid by union members must be used to 
subsidize the nonmembers, causing the union to divert resources that might 
otherwise be used for political activity to fund the subsidy. Moreover, as 
Mancur Olson demonstrated almost half a century ago in his classic work 
The Logic of Collective Action, absent a union security fee provision in the 
collective bargaining agreement, many workers who desire union 
representation will make the economically rational decision not to join the 
union and pay dues. This is because improved wages and working 
conditions and most other goals sought by a union are, with respect to the 
workers it represents, collective goods. They cannot be withheld from 
workers in the bargaining unit who choose not to join the union. Absent a 
union security agreement requiring those who choose not to join to pay a 
service fee, economically rational workers will not join the union because 
84. Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc.,431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
85. See id.; see also Locke v. Karras, 555 U.S. 207 (2009); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 
U.S. 507 (1991). 
86. Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (I986). 
87. Davenport v. Wash. Educ, Ass'n, 55 I U.S. 177 (2007). 
---------
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each worker will not perceptibly strengthen the union through his or her 
membership alone and all workers will receive the benefits the union 
achieves regardless of whether they join and pay dues.88 
In a more recent study, Greg Hundley found that where the law 
permits an agency-shop fee, the probability of coverage by a collective 
bargaining agreement increases for union members and for nonmembers, 
but where the law mandates an agency-shop fee the probability overall for 
coverage by a collective bargaining agreement increases but the probability 
that those covered will be nonmembers is at its lowest compared to where 
agency-shop fees are permitted or prohibited. The lowest rates of coverage 
by collective bargaining agreements for union members and nonmembers 
occur where the law does not allow agency shop. Hundley writes: 
The very low rate of covered nonmembership under a mandatory 
agency-shop law is consistent with the low marginal cost of membership 
under such a law. But this does not explain why so many workers prefer 
coverage, as the certain prospect of an agency fee should deter some 
workers from seeking representation. It could be ... that workers are 
more likely to engage in a collective activity when other members of the 
group are required to contribute. 89 
Hundley's findings and explanation are consistent with Olson's analysis. 
The experience in the Nebraska public sector is also consistent with 
Olson's analysis. Under a Nebraska statute, employees who are not 
members of the union that represents them may choose their own 
representatives in grievances or legal actions or pay the union for the costs 
incurred in representing them.9° Consequently, even though Nebraska is a 
right-to-work state, teacher unions enjoy 100% membership because 
teachers do not want to lose representation if they should need it 
individually.91 
The Nebraska public sector notwithstanding, unions who serve as 
exclusive bargaining representatives generally may not discriminate against 
employees in the bargaining unit who are not members with respect to 
representation.92 Consequently, in the absence of an agency-shop or fair-
share agreement, we can expect union membership to be considerably 
88. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTrYE ACTION 76-91 (1965). 
89. Greg Hundley, Collective Bargaining Coverage of Union Members and Nonmembers in the 
Public Sector, 32 INDUS. REL. 72, 90 (1993). 
90. NEB. REV. STAT.§ 48-838. 
91. E-mail from Professor Steven Willborn, University of Nebraska, to Martin Malin (July 6, 
2011). 
92. For example, a union's duty of fair representation generally does not require it to provde a 
lawyer to represent an employee in 3. grievance arbitration, see, e.g., Castelli v. Douglass Aircraft Co., 
752 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1985), but a union does breach its duty if it provides attorneys only to 
union members. See id.; Nat'! Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 
Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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lower, even among workers who desire union representation. This 
magnifies the degree to which dues paid by members have to be diverted to 
subsidize representation of nonmembers. To those who regard union 
security arrangements as inappropriately advantaging unions in the political 
process, this diversion is exactly what is intended. To the extent that union 
security arrangements allow unions to avoid diverting dues paid by 
members to fund representation of nonmembers, such arrangements do 
advantage unions in the political process by enabling them to allocate 
greater resources to political and ideological activity, but the case has not 
been made that such advantage is inappropriate. 
McGinnis and Schanzenbach 's claim that unions are privileged 
because they have "the legal privilege of assessing dues from their 
members," and "the coercive authority to collect dues" is simply false. 
Unions' assessment of dues from their members is no different than that of 
any other membership group. To become a member and to be entitled to 
the rights and privileges of membership, an individual has to pay dues. The 
consequence of a failure to pay dues is a loss of membership. A union's 
authority to collect dues is no more or less coercive than that of any other 
membership organization. 
A union that has a union security agreement does have authority to 
coerce the payment of agency-shop or fair-share fees, as opposed to dues. 
But the strict limitations that the law places on those fees ensure that they 
will not be used, even indirectly, for political or ideological purposes. 
Thus, it cannot be said that unions are coercively gaining the ability to 
advance their political agendas by using funds from individuals opposed to 
those agendas. Individuals who object have the right to not be charged for 
such political or ideological expenditures. Indeed, in the absence of union 
security arrangements, unions labor under a disadvantage that is not 
imposed on other membership groups as they are forced to divert members' 
dues to subsidize services provided to nonmembers. As I have argued 
elsewhere, the strongest constitutional justification for allowing agency-
shop or fair-share fees is that such arrangements appropriately balance the 
conflicting First Amendment rights of fee payers and union members.93 
Agency-shop and fair-share fee agreements result in more employees 
becoming members of the union because the relatively small monetary 
savings they would achieve by being fee payers is not worth the costs of 
nonmembership, such as not having a right to vote for union officers and 
being excluded from internal union events limited to members. 
Consequently, the argument goes, even though unions cannot compel 
93. Martin H. Malin, 11ie Evolving Law of Agency Shop in the Public Sector, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 855 
(1989). 
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employees to subsidize their ideological and political activities, allowing 
agency-shop and fair-share fee arrangements enables unions to build their 
treasuries for political purposes through dues paid by members who do not 
necessarily support the union's political agenda. But members who 
disagree with their unions' political or ideological expenditures retain the 
option of terminating their memberships and becoming fee payers. Such a 
right to opt out places them in a superior position to, for example, public 
employees who contribute to retirement funds that invest those 
contributions in stock of companies that make political or ideological 
contributions from their general treasuries to which the employees object. 
Those employees have no opt-out option,94 and the Supreme Court has held 
that a desire to protect them from such expenditures does not 
constitutionally justify restrictions on the companies' abilities to spend from 
the general treasury on political campaigns. 95 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's rhetoric has grown increasingly 
hostile to union security arrangements in the public sector, although its 
legal doctrine has remained relatively stable. In Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education,96 the Court held that public employers and the .unions 
representing their employees may agree to require nonmembers in the 
bargaining unit to pay the union a fee representing the nonmember's pro 
rata share of the costs of representation with respect to wages, hours and 
terms and conditions of employment. The Court rejected the argument that 
collective bargaining in the public sector is inherently political and 
therefore employees who express their dissent by not joining the union may 
not constitutionally be compelled to support the process financially. In so 
doing, the court regarded union security issues in the public sector to be no 
different from union security issues in the private sector: 
The differences between public- and private-sector collective bargaining 
simply do not translate into differences in First Amendment rights. 
Even those commentators most acutely aware of the distinctive nature of 
public-sector bargaining and most seriously concerned with its policy 
implications agree that "[t]he union security issue in the public 
sector . . . is fundamentally the same issue . . . as in the private 
_sector . ... No special dimension results from the fact that a union 
represents public rather than private employees. " 97 
Unfortunately, the Court's decision in Abood injected an ambiguity 
into the analysis, which did not exist in the private sector precedents on 
94. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-out Rights After Citizens 
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012). 
95. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
96. 431U.S.209 (1977). 
97. Id. at 232. 
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which the Court relied. In Railway Employees Department v. Hanson,98 the 
Court held that a union shop provision in a collective bargaining agreement 
authorized by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) did not amount to enforced 
ideological conformity on employees opposed to the union and therefore 
did not violate the First Amendment. 99 It left open the question whether the 
expenditure of employees' dues on political activities over the employees' 
objections might violate the objectors' First Amendment rights. 100 
In International Association of Machinists v. Street,101 the Court 
answered the question it had left open in the affirmative. The Court 
recognized that expenditure of objecting employees' dues on political 
causes could violate the objectors' First Amendment rights of free 
expression but avoided the constitutional issue by interpreting the RLA to 
prohibit such expenditures. 102 In Abood, the Court squarely held that its 
private sector precedents applied equally to the First Amendment issues 
raised by an agency-shop provision in a public sector collective bargaining 
agreement, but injected some ambiguity into the analysis. The Court wrote: 
To compel employees financially to support their collective-
bargaining representative has an impact upon their First Amendment 
interests. An employee may very well have ideological objections to a 
wide variety of activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive 
representative. His moral or religious views about the desirability of 
abortion may not square with the union's policy in negotiating a medical 
benefits plan. One individual might disagree with a union policy of 
negotiating limits on the right to strike, believing that to be the road to 
serfdom for the working class, while another might have economic or 
political objections to unionism itself. An employee might object to the 
union's wage policy because it violates guidelines designed to limit 
inflation, or might object to the union's seeking a clause in the 
collective-bargaining agreement proscribing racial discrimination. The 
examples could be multiplied. To be required to help finance the union 
as a collective-bargaining agent might well be thought, therefore, to 
interfere in some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the 
advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit. But the 
judgment clearly made in Hanson and Street is that such interference as 
exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the 
important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations 
established by Congress. 103 
98. 351U.S.225 (1956). 
99. Id. at 231. 
100. Id. 
IOI. 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
102. Id. at 212-13. 
103. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 (footnote omitted). The Court has quoted this language in its 
subsequent agency shop decisions. See, e.g., Locke, 555 U.S. at 212. 
~ ·-~---------------------. --
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I have argued that the above quoted language from Abood, when read 
in context, need not and should not be read to reflect a rejection of 
Hanson's basic premise that compelled financial support of the exclusive 
bargaining representative does not in any way implicate objectors' First 
Amendment rights, absent compelled financial support of political or 
ideological expenditures. 104 But the language can be read to mean that any 
compelled financial support of the exclusive representative infringes on 
objectors' First Amendment rights of free association with such 
infringement constitutionally justified with respect to compelled support of 
expenditures germane to collective bargaining by the government's interest 
in stable labor relations resulting from enabling the union to avoid free 
riders, i.e., employees receiving the benefits of union representation without 
paying for them. The Court's most recent jurisprudence in this area has 
adopted this latter view of Abood, and has turned hostile toward union 
security provisions in the public sector. 
Thirty years after Abood, in upholding the constitutionality of the State 
of Washington's requirement that nonmember fee payers affirmatively 
consent to being charged for political and ideological activity before such 
charges may be imposed, the Court in Davenport v. Washington Education 
Association, characterized agency fee agreements as giving the union "the 
power, in essence, to tax government employees . . . an extraordinary 
power."105 It further characterized the agency fee as "the union's 
extraordinary state entitlement to acquire and spend other people's 
money."106 The Court distinguished the Washington statute's application to 
public sector collective bargaining agreements from its application to 
private sector collective bargaining agreements, observing that application 
to the private sector "presents a somewhat different constitutional 
question," but concluding that the private sector issue was not properly 
before the Court. 107 
The Court's hostility to union security provisions in public sector 
collective bargaining agreements was magnified in Knox v. Service 
Employees International Union Local !000. 108 In June 2005, Local 1000 
sent its annual notice to nonmember fee payers for whom it served as 
exclusive bargaining representative advising them of the percentage of dues 
spent on activity related to collective bargaining, giving them thirty days to 
object and advising them that if they failed to object they would be charged 
104. Malin, supra note 93, at 858-61. 
105. 551U.S.177, 184 (2007). 
106. Id. at 187. 
107. Id. at 190. 
108. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
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full dues. 109 After the thirty-day objection window closed, Local 1000 
imposed a special assessment to be used entirely to fund political 
activity. 110 Fee payers who had objected during the thirty-day period to 
paying full union dues were required to pay a percentage of the special 
assessment equal to the percentage of regular dues they were being charged 
but fee payers who had failed to object during the thirty-day window were 
required to pay the full special assessment. 111 Both groups sued alleging 
that the compelled payments were unconstitutional. 
As litigated in the lower courts, the fee payers' lawsuit raised two 
questions. With respect to the fee payers who had objected to being 
charged full dues, the suit claimed that the union could rely on its prior 
calculation to determine what percentage of the new assessment could be 
charged to objectors. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, 112 but the 
court did not expressly address the claim by the fee payers who had not 
previously objected to paying full dues that, in light of the special 
assessment, they were entitled to a new opportunity to opt to pay the 
reduced amount. It appeared to combine that issue with the issue of 
whether the special assessment impacted the continuing validity of the 
original notice sent to all fee payers. 
The Ninth Circuit regarded the entire case as governed by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Chicago Teachers Union Local J v. Hudson, 113 which 
mandated notice to fee payers of how the union calculated their fees, an 
opportunity to object to the calculation and to have the objection resolved in 
a reasonably prompt manner by a neutral adjudicator. Hudson, however, 
could not control the question of whether fee payers who had not objected 
to paying full dues following the first notice were entitled to a new 
opportunity to object because the union in Hudson did not charge any fee 
payers full dues regardless of objection. It charged a fee reduced by the 
percentage of dues spent on political and ideological activity to all fee 
payers and passed along to all fee payers the benefit of any further 
reduction resulting from any fee payer's challenge to the union's 
calculation.114 
Although the Court in Abood, adopted its RLA precedent that fee 
payer dissent to union political and ideological expenditures is not to be 
presumed but must be communicated to the union before fee payers become 
109. Id. at 2285. 
110. Id. at 2285-86. 
111. Id. at 2286. 
112. Knox v. Cal. State Employees Ass'n, 628 F.3d 1115, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. 
Knox v. Service Employees Int'l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
113. 475 U.S. 292 (1986); see Knox, 628 F.3d at 1117 (describing the question presented as whether 
Hudson required a new notice in light of the special assessment). 
114. See Malin, supra note 93, at 881-82 (discussing this aspect of Hudson). 
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constitutionally entitled to having their fees exclude those expenditures,115 
the Court found the requirement of communicating dissent satisfied by the 
filing of a lawsuit, 116 but in Abood, the union had not instituted procedures 
for fee payer objections. Knox thus raised the issue of whether a union 
may, by instituting formal objection procedures, confine fee payers to a 
thirty-day window for voicing their dissent. 117 
In Knox, the Court majority went beyond the issues presented and held 
not only that the fee payers were entitled to a new notice but that the special 
assessment could only be imposed on those fee payers who affirmatively 
indicated their consent to pay it. This rather extreme judicial activism was 
criticized harshly by four members of the Court, 118 and has been similarly 
criticized by labor law and constitutional law scholars. 119 The opinion 
ratcheted up the hostile rhetoric previously displayed in Davenport. 
Without acknowledging Abood's determination that "[t]he differences 
between public- and private-sector collective bargaining simply do not 
translate into differences in First Amendment rights,"120 the Knox majority 
rejected it. The Knox majority wrote, "Because a public-sector union takes 
many positions during collective bargaining that have powerful political 
and civic consequences, the compulsory fees constitute a form of compelled 
speech and association .... " 121 The Court added ominously, "[W]e do not 
today revisit whether the Court's former cases have given adequate 
recognition to the critical First Amendment rights at stake."122 It 
characterized authorizing union security fees to enable unions to avoid free 
riders as "something of an anomaly" and an analysis "generally insufficient 
to overcome First Amendment objections."123 
The Court thus signaled its receptivity to overruling Abood and 
prohibiting agency-shop and fair-share fees in the public sector. It also 
attacked the generally accepted principle that fee payer dissent to political 
and ideological expenditures is not to be presumed, characterizing the 
principle as an "offhand remark," that was "stated in passing" without 
"consider[ing] the broader constitutional implications of an affirmative opt-
115. Abood, 431 U.S. at 236-37. 
116. Id at 241 (following Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks freight Handlers, Exp. and Station Emp. v. 
Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 119 n.6 (1963). decided under the Railway labor Act). 
117, I have urged that where unions have formal objection procedures they be allowed to insist that 
fee payers use them but that they not be allowed to confine fee payers to a defined time period in which 
to voice their dissent. Malin, supra note 93, at 881-83 & n.135. 
118. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2297-98 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2306 
(Breyer, J ., joined by Kagan, J., dissenting). 
119. See Catherine I. Fisk & Ewin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After 
Know v. SEJU Local 1000 (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
120. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
121. Knox,132S.Ct.at2289. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 2289-90. 
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out requirement."124 The Court thus signaled that even if it does not 
overrule Abood, it may prohibit charging fee payers for political and 
ideological expenditures generally unless the fee payers affirmatively 
consent to such charges. 125 
The Court's more hostile characterization of union security in the 
public sector is most unfortunate. Union security agreements are not the 
extraordinary instruments that the Court suggests. For example, they are 
clearly analogous to laws requiring attorneys licensed in a state to join the 
state's unified bar association, 126 and student activity fees imposed by state 
colleges and universities used to subsidize a variety of student 
organizations. 127 
In Knox, the Court supported its characterization of allowing unions to 
prevent free riders by charging them fees as anomalous, quoting examples 
from a Clyde Summers book review of Sheldon Leader's Freedom of 
Association: A Study in Labor Law and Political Theory: 
If a community association engages in a clean.up campaign or opposes 
encroachments by industrial development, no one suggests that all 
residents or property owners who benefit be required to contribute. If a 
parent-teacher association raises money for the school library, 
assessments are not levied on all parents. If an association of university 
professors has as a major function bringing pressure on universities to 
observe standards of tenure and academic freedom, most professors 
would consider it an outrage to be required to join. If a medical 
association lobbies against regulation of fees, not all doctors who share 
in the benefits share in the costs. 128 
The Court, however, omitted the sentences immediately preceding and 
the sentence immediately following the quoted portion of the book review. 
Those sentences state as follows (with the portion quoted by the Court 
indicated by my ellipses): 
The author fails to discuss a more general difficulty with the free rider 
argument: Why is it not applicable to a wide range of private 
124. Id. at 2290. 
125. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 119. The prospect of the Court changing the law 
governing public sector union security may soon be upon us. In Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 
2011 ), the plaintiffs alleged that the collective bargaining agreement between the State of Illinois and the 
union representing home-care personal assistants in home-based Medicaid waiver programs 
unconstitutionally required non-members to pay fair share fees. Although the plaintiffs sought to 
characterize the assistants as independent entrepreneurs unconstitutionally compelled to support 
financially a lobbying organization, the court analyzed the facts and concluded that the assistants were 
employees of the state. The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Normally, 
we would expect the Court to reject a petition to review such a fact-based determination out of hand. 
The Court, however, has asked the U.S. government for its views with respect to the petition. Harris v. 
Quinn, No. 11-681,2012 WL2470091 (June29,2012). 
126. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. I (1990). 
127. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
128. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289-90 (footnote and citation omitted). 
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associations? ... The author, like most other advocates of the free rider 
argument, never explains why the argument should be compelling when 
applied to unions, but not other associations. 129 
301 
Contrary to what the Court apparently wished to convey, Summers 
was not indicting union security fees but was critiquing the inadequacy of 
Leader's defense. Summers went on to give the explanation that he 
considered superior to Leader's: 
The tolerance of free riders is one of the hallmarks of a free market 
system and an inescapable condition in any complex democratic social 
system. I would suggest that the appeal to the free rider argument on 
behalf of unions has more to do with the special role unions play in our 
society than with conceptions of freedom of association, and the 
author's conceptual approach simply cannot explain why unions are, or 
should be, treated differently. 130 
The special role that unions play in society accounts for our labor laws 
conferring on them the status of exclusive representative. As such, they are 
unlike, for example, the parent-teacher association that raises money for the 
school library which has no legal obligation to divert members' dues that it 
might otherwise spend on political activity to represent nonmember parents 
who claim that their children were denied library privileges. In contrast, the 
union that negotiates for additional personal days is legally obligated to 
represent nonmember employees who claim they were denied personal days 
in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, even though the cost of 
such representation may divert members' dues from funding political 
activities that the union has a First Amendment right to fund. 
Despite the Court's characterization of agency fees in Davenport, a 
public employer's agreement with a union to include an agency fee 
provision in their collective bargaining agreement cannot accurately be 
described as conferring on the union the power to tax employees. The 
power of taxation is a power of sovereignty, whereas the union security 
arrangement is the result of a broader contract between the public employer 
and the union. In other words, a unit of government agrees to union 
security in its capacity as an employer rather than in its capacity as 
sovereign. The Court has long recognized that the Constitution affords 
government greater flexibility when it acts as employer than when it acts as 
sovereign.131 
Union security agreements serve the same labor relations purposes in 
the public sector as they do in the private sector. They do not privilege 
unions to use the money of those opposed to their political agendas to 
129. Clyde Summers, Book Review, 16 COMP. LAB. LJ. 262, 268 (1995). 
130. Id. 
131. See, e.g., Enquist v. Ore. Dep't of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myeis, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
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finance their political activities. They cannot be said to inappropriately 
advantage unions in the broader political process. 
B. Dues Check-Off 
Payment of union dues by payroll deduction generally requires written 
authorization from the employee.132 Consequently, dues check-off cannot 
be thought of as coercive; that most members authorize it as a convenient 
method of payment does not defeat its voluntary nature. Prohibitions on 
dues check-off, however, can have a devastating effect on union ability to 
represent employees. For example, New York's Taylor Law prohibits 
strikes by public employees in that state.133 One penalty against a union for 
engaging in an illegal strike is suspension of the union's dues check-off.134 
When the United Federation of Teachers engaged in an illegal strike against 
the New York City Public Schools from September 9 through September 
16, 1976, the New York Public Employment Relations Board (NYPERB) 
suspended its dues check-off. Litigation over the penalty delayed its 
imposition until May I, 1982. In the first three months of the suspension, 
the union's revenue from dues and agency-shop fees dropped by $1.3 
million and when the cost of dues and fee collection was considered, it had 
lost $2 million. Finding that the loss in income impaired the union's ability 
to provide necessary representational services, the NYPERB restored the 
dues check-off.135 
The district court's decision in Wisconsin Education Association 
Council v. Walker enjoining the prohibition on dues check-off in Wisconsin 
illustrates the absence of any principled basis for such action.136 Wisconsin 
Act 10, among other provisions, prohibited employers from allowing union 
members to pay their dues by payroll deduction. The act divided public 
employees into general public employees and public safety employees. 
Public safety employees were defined as police officers, firefighters, deputy 
sheriffs, county traffic police officers, village police officers and 
132. Some states mandate payroll deduction of agency-shop or fair-share fees. See, e.g., 5 ILL 
COMP. STAT. 31S/6(e) (Supp. 2012); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. Sill (2006); 34 N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 13A-5.S, 
13A-5.6 (West 2006). To the extent that payroll deduction is mandated by state statute, it may be 
thought of as coercive but as developed above, it only coerces payment of the fee payer's pro rata share 
of the costs of representation in collective bargaining; it does not coerce financial support of the union's 
political and ideological activities. 
133. N.Y. CIV. SERV. Art. 14, § 210. 
134. Id. 
135. United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, NYSUT, AFT, 15 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 'i 3091 (1982). For 
additional examples of the devastating financial impact loss of dues check-off can have, see Ann C. 
Hodges, Maintaining Union Resources in an Era of Public Sector Bargaining Retrenchment, 16 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 599 (2012). 
136. 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), rev'd, Nos. 12-1854, 12-2011 & 12-2058 (7th Cir. Jan. 
18, 2013). 
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firefighters, state troopers, and state motor vehicle inspectors. The act 
prohibited dues check-off for general employees but allowed it for public 
safety employees. 137 
The record reflected that the unions who represented the Milwaukee 
police and Milwaukee firefighters, the West Allis Professional Police 
Association, the Wisconsin Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs Association and 
the Wisconsin Troopers Association (representing troopers and motor 
vehicle inspectors) all had endorsed Scott Walker for governor in the 2010 
campaign. In contrast, the unions representing other law enforcement and 
fire service employees, such as the Wisconsin Capitol Police, the University 
of Wisconsin Campus Police, state correctional officers, probation and 
parole officers, conservation wardens, fire crash rescue specialists, and state 
criminal investigation agents and the unions representing most other public 
employees in the state endorsed Governor Walker's opponent. 138 In other 
words, Act 10 essentially prohibited dues check-off in bargaining units 
whose employees were represented by unions that had opposed Governor 
Walker's election and allowed it in bargaining units whose employees were 
represented by unions that had supported the governor. 
The district court found that Act !O's distinction between general and 
public safety employees for purposes of allowing or prohibiting dues check-
off lacked any rational basis and therefore violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 139 The court also found that it 
violated the First Amendment. The court distinguished Ysursa v. Pocatello 
Education Association, 140 where the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
Idaho's prohibition on any check-off of monies to be used for political 
purposes on the ground that the Wisconsin enactment did not apply across 
the board but instead discriminated on the basis of speaker viewpoint. 
The fact that none of the public employee unions falling into the 
general category endorsed Walker in the 2010 election and that all of the 
unions that endorsed Walker fall within the public safety category 
certainly suggests that unions representing general employees have 
different viewpoints than those of the unions representing public safety 
employees. Moreover, Supreme Court jurisprudence and the evidence 
ofrecord strongly suggests that the exemption of those unions from Act 
!O's prohibition on automatic dues deductions enhances the ability of 
unions representing public safety employees to continue to support this 
Governor and his party. 141 
137. Id. at 859. 
138. Id. at 864-<i5. 
139. Id. at 876. 
140. 555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
141. Wisc. Educ. Ass'n Council, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 873. The court also quoted Wisconsin State 
Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald's comments that Act 10 would deny funds to President 
Obama's reelection campaign. Id. at 875 & n.17. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Nos. 12· 
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Similarly, in United Food and Commercial Workers v. Brewer, 142 the 
court issued a preliminary injunction against the Protect Arizona 
Employees' Paychecks from Politics Act, which required unions whose 
members paid their dues by payroll deduction to certify that they did not 
use dues for political purposes or to specify the percentage of dues that they 
would use for political purposes. Payroll deduction of the percentage 
specified was prohibited unless the individual employee affirmatively 
consented to such deduction on an annual basis. These restrictions did not 
apply to unions representing public safety employees or to other groups 
who received money by payroll deduction, such as retirement plan 
administrators, charitable organizations, and insurance companies.143 The 
court issued a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff unions were 
likely to succeed on the merits because the act unconstitutionally 
discriminated based on speaker viewpoint. 144 
The academic attack on dues check-off is as unprincipled as the 
legislative attack. McGinnis and Schanzenbach decry union political 
spending opposing privatization, supporting teacher tenure, and supporting 
increases in government services. 145 DiSalvo decries union support of 
Democratic candidates, efforts to recall Governor Walker and Republican 
state senators in Wisconsin, and the successful referendum overturning the 
Ohio statute that would have significantly curtailed public employee 
collective bargaining rights. 146 He complains that "two of the top five 
biggest spenders in Wisconsin's 2003 and 2004 state elections were the 
Wisconsin Education Association Council and the AFSCME-affiliated 
Wisconsin PEOPLE Conference. Only the state Republican Party and two 
other political action committees-those belonging to the National 
Association of Realtors and SBC/Ameritech-spent more."147 
Despite DiSalvo's assertions to the contrary, prohibitions on union 
security arrangements and dues check-offs do not level the political playing 
1854, 12-2011 & 12-2058 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2012). The majority did not dispute the facts as found by 
the district court and detailed above. The majority, however, concluded that the facts, as a matter of law, 
did not establish discrimination based on viewpoint, noting, for ex.ample, that the category of public 
safety employees included municipal police and firefighter bargaining units represented by unions that 
had endorsed Governor Walker's opponent, slip. op. at 22, discounting the statement by Senate Majority 
Leader Fitzgerald as not necessarily reflective of the intentions of the legislature as a whole, id. at 25, 
and characterizing dues check-off as a governmental subsidy of speech and opining that governments 
may discriminate when they subsidize speech. Id. at 10-13. 
142. 817 F. Supp. Zd 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
143. Id. at 1121-22. 
144. Id. at 1124-27; see also Bailey v. Callaghan, 193 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2820 (E.D. Mich. 2012), 
stay denied, 2012 WL 3134338 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2012) (preliminarily enjoining Michigan statute 
prohibiting dues check-off for public education employees). 
145. McGinnis & Schanzenbach, supra note 69. 
146. DISALVO, supra note 6&, at 3-5. 
14 7. DiSalvo, supra note 66, at 11. 
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field. Rather, they clear the field so that the only major spenders on 
political activity are entities such as the Wisconsin Republican Party, the 
National Association of Realtors, and SBC/Ameritech (now AT&T). 
Wellington and Winter regarded the organization of workers into an 
effective political voice as one of the positive justifications for collective 
bargaining in both the private and public sectors. 148 The decades of 
experience since their classic work was published bear this out. To the 
extent that public sector collective bargaining furthers unions as an effective 
voice that counters business and commercial interests in the public debate, 
it furthers, rather than distorts, democracy. 
N. CONCLUSION 
Public sector collective bargaining is said to distort democracy in two 
ways. First, it allegedly excludes competing voices from public decision-
making. Second, it allegedly inappropriately advantages public employee 
unions in the broader political process. 
The first concern has led to the narrowing of the scope of bargaining in 
the public sector. This is the wrong road to travel. Rather than replace 
collective bargaining with unilateral employer control, we should break 
away from the private-sector model and develop creative approaches to 
mandate employee voice in a broad array of matters that affect them which 
will not freeze out other voices. 
The second concern has led to prohibitions on agency-shop and fair-
share fees and to prohibitions or restrictions on dues check-off. These 
measures lack any principled basis and derive from their proponents' 
dislike of the political positions taken by public sector unions. Rather than 
distort democracy, to the extent that public employee collective bargaining 
facilitates the organization of workers and amplifies their voices in the 
political arena, it furthers the democratic process by balancing business, 
commercial, and similar interests. 
148. WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 7, at 8-9, 12. 
